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FOIA Exemption 7 and Broader Disclosure of
Unlawful FBI Investigations
A Popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)2 represents an at-
tempt by Congress to eliminate barriers that have restricted
public access to government-controlled information.3 Although
the FOIA makes nearly all government records presumptively
accessible, it also provides several narrowly drawn exemptions
that recognize individual privacy rights and the practical neces-
sity of keeping certain records confidential.4 Exemption 7 of
the FOIA,5 which permits the withholding of certain law en-
forcement records, attempts to balance individual constitu-
tional rights, the government's need to enforce its laws, and the
public's need to monitor law enforcement agencies.6
The balance struck by Exemption 7 has become particu-
larly controversial in the context of investigations conducted by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Although the FBI
serves a paramount social interest in enforcing criminal laws, it
has also engaged in a well-documented, long-standing pattern
of unauthorized political surveillance and harassment of partic-
1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in
THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
3. See 109 CONG. REC. 9961 (1963) (statement of Sen. Long).
4. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d CONG., 2d SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
SOURCE BOOK 36, 38 (Comm. Print 1974) (hereinafter cited as 1974 SOURCE
BooK).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1976); see note 16 infra and accompanying text.
6. The Senate Report accompanying the original FOIA stated: "It is not
an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not an impossible one
either... Success lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses,
balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest possible
disclosure." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1965), reprinted in 1974
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, at 37-38.
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ular individuals and groups.7 Congress has not expressly indi-
cated whether records from such unlawful investigations
should be subject to full disclosure, or be withheld under Ex-
emption 7.8 Some of the circuit courts of appeals have adopted
polar positions, with one court holding that no records from an
unlawful investigation can be withheld,9 and others holding
that Exemption 7 applies fully to FBI records regardless of the
unlawfulness with which they were gathered. 0 This division
among the courts reflects both the fundamental values impli-
cated when the FBI abuses its power," and the serious risks
that sometimes accompany the disclosure of criminal law en-
forcement records.
Part H of this Note summarizes the development of Ex-
emption 7 to identify the policies Congress sought to imple-
ment, and briefly examines how the courts have applied those
policies to law enforcement investigations generally. Part III
outlines the scope of unlawful FBI activity and the range of po-
tential deterrents to such conduct, and analyzes how courts
have applied Exemption 7 to unlawful investigations. The Note
concludes that current judicial approaches do not balance satis-
factorily the underlying values at issue, and proposes an alter-
native approach in Part IV. The proposed alternative would
require the FBI to demonstrate a nexus between each docu-
ment withheld and a lawful investigatory purpose. When such
a nexus is weak, judicial discretion to approve continued with-
holding would be permitted only when disclosure seriously
risks grave harm to a third party.
1. FOIA EXEMPTION 7
The FOIA establishes a "general philosophy of full agency
disclosure [to any person] unless information is exempted
under clearly delineated statutory language."12 When an infor-
7. See notes 58-84 infra and accompanying text.
8. See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra.
9. See Abramson v. FBI, No. 79-2500 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 1980); notes 127-37
infra and accompanying text.
10. See Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1980); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d
468 (lst Cir. 1979); notes 104-14 infra and accompanying text.
11. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (7) (1976) ("Each agency that maintains a system
of records shall... maintain no record describing how any individual exer-
cises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized
by statute ... or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law
enforcement activity. .. .") (emphasis added).
12. S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1964), reprinted in 1974 SouRcE
BooK, supra note 4, at 86, 93; see 1 Y. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE L&w TREATISE
§ 5:28, at 387 (2d ed. 1978) (emphasizing the narrow intent of the FOIA's "specif-
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mation request is filed, an agency that seeks to withhold any
part of the requested information must specify the statutory
exemption that permits such action.13 If the requestor brings
an action to compel disclosure, the agency bears the burden of
demonstrating in court that the particular exemption applies to
the document or documents at issue.14
A. THE 1974 AMENDMENTS
The FOLA presumes that investigatory records, like most
other federal documents, are "available to any person" request-
ing them.'5  Under Exemption 7, however, "investigatory
records compiled for law enforcement purposes" may be with-
held from disclosure, but only to the extent that such disclo-
sure would
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a
right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a
confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal
law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or
by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investi-
gation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential
source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F)
endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personneL1 6
ically exempted" language). See generally J. O'RELY, FEDERAL INFORMATION
DIsCLOSURE (1980); LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AcT (5th ed. C. Marwick 1979); Davis, The Information Act. A Preliminary
Analysis, 34 U. CHi L. REV. 761 (1967); Koch, The Freedom of Information Act:
Suggestions for Making Information Available to the Public, 32 MD. L REV. 189
(1972); Symposium on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act,
25 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1975); Project, Government Information and the Rights of
Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971 (1974); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A
Seven Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L REV. 895 (1974).
13. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (A) (1976).
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1976). The FOIA provides that each fed-
eral agency shall make available, to any person, records that are reasonably de-
scribed and requested "in accordance with published rules". Id. § 552(a) (3). If
a request is denied, the requestor may bring an action in district court to have
the agency enjoined from withholding the records. Id. § 552(a) (4) (B). When
challenged, nondisclosure is permitted only when the court, reviewing the mat-
ter de novo, agrees that the exemption applies. Id.
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1976); note 14 supra.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1976). Although an agency may designate certain
investigatory files as having been compiled for law enforcement purposes, the
propriety of that classification is subject to a judicial determination. See, e.g.,
Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(en bane), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). In addition, Exemption 7, like all
exemptions to the disclosure requirements of the FOIA, must be narrowly con-
strued because "disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act."
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). Noting that "Con-
gress provided in § 552(c) that nothing in the Act should be read 'to authorize
withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, ex-
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These requirements were adopted in 1974 in response to judi-
cial decisions that had been overly broad in their interpretation
of the original "law enforcement" exemption.17
As originally adopted in 1966, Exemption 7 allowed the
withholding of "investigatory ifies compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes except to the extent [that such files are] avail-
able by law to a private party."18 Initially courts took a
functional approach in interpreting this exemption. In Bristol-
Meyers Co. v. FTC,19 for example, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that documents originally
compiled during a law enforcement investigation lost their pro-
tected status when the investigation ended without a prosecu-
tion.20 Noting that the purpose of the exemption was to
prevent premature discovery of the government's case,21 the
court reasoned that this purpose could not be served following
the abandonment or completion of the enforcement proceed-
ing 2 2
cept as specifically stated... ,' the court concluded that "'[t]hese exemp-
tions are explicitly made exclusive... 'and must be narrowly construed." Id.
at 361 (citation omitted).
17. See notes 23-34 infra and accompanying text.
18. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 254 (1966). The early reform bills, which did
not include any exemption for investigatory files, were opposed by the Justice
Department on the ground that the department did not want any investigative
files of the FBI made currently available to the press and public, regardless of
whether such files were legally or illegally compiled. See Freedom of Informa-
tion" Hearings on S. 1666 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 202
(1963) (statement of Norbert Schlei, Assistant Attorney General). In finally ad-
ding the exemption, Congress appears to have been motivated largely by con-
cern over disclosure prior to the completion of enforcement proceedings. See
110 CONG. REC. 17667 (1964) (colloquy between Sen. Humphrey and Sen. Long).
19. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
20. 424 F.2d at 939.
21. Id. at 938. Although the senate report accompanying the original FOIA
indicated that it might be operationally necessary to keep FBI investigatory
fies confidential, see S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in
1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, at 38, the report went on to explain that Ex-
emption 7 is applicable to those files prepared by government agencies to pros-
ecute law violators. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1974 SOURCE Boo, supra note 4, at 44.
The rationale was that "disclosure of such files, except to the extent they are
available by law to a private party, could harm the Government's case in
court." Id.
22. 424 F.2d at 938; accord, Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir.
1971). Cf. Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817-18 (2d Cir. 1972) (reading into Ex-
emption 7 the additional purpose of preventing the disclosure of either investi-
gative techniques or the names of informants, and holding that the exemption
applied even after the enforcement proceedings had terminated), cert. denied;
409 U.S. 889 (1972); Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir.
1971) (same), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); contra, Cowles Communications
Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726, 727 (N.D. CaL 1971).
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The functional approach was later abandoned by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in favor of an approach focusing on
"how and under what circumstances" the government files
were compiled.23 For example, in Weisberg v. United States De-
partment of Justice,24 a private party requested FBI records
pertaining to the spectrographic analysis of the bullet that
killed President Kennedy. Although the FBI was contemplat-
ing no enforcement proceedings, the court held that the re-
quested records were exempt from disclosure because the
records "were part of the investigatory files compiled by the
FBI for law enforcement purposes." 25 Adopting a literal read-
ing of Exemption 7, the court held that judicial review was lim-
ited to determining whether the materials were (1)
investigatory files, and (2) compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses.26 Weisberg was quickly followed by a trilogy of cases 27
in which the District of Columbia Circuit extended this per se
rule to virtually every government agency-thus ending specu-
lation that Weisberg simply sought to apply a separate stan-
dard to FBI files. 28 Judicial inquiry in Exemption 7 cases
became limited to an examination of "how and under what cir-
cumstances" the requested files were compiled-regardless of
whether any future enforcement proceeding was likely to be
based upon the files.
In the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA,29 Congress explicitly
rejected the per se rule of the District of Columbia Circuit as
one that shielded too much information from disclosure. 30 Ap-
parently distressed by the court decisions noted above and by
revelations of political abuses under the Nixon Administra-
23. See Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
24. 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en ban), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993
(1974).
25. 489 F.2d at 1197.
26. Id. at 1198.
27. Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Wein-
berger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d
24 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This series of cases has been referred to as the "last straw"
that led to the amendment of Exemption 7. See Note, Backdooring the NLRB.
Use and Abuse of the Amended FOIA for Administrative Discovery, 8 Loy. Cm.
L.J. 145, 154 (1976).
28. See Note, The Investigatory Files Exemption to the FOIA: The D.C. Cir-
cuit Abandons Bristol-Meyers, 42 GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 869, 886-87 (1974).
29. Pub. I No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976)).
30. 120 CONG. Rac. 17039-40 (1974).
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tion,31 Congress went beyond several committee reports recom-
mending mere procedural changes in the FOIA32 and adopted
Senator Hart's floor amendment to Exemption 7 that specified
the basic categories for nondisclosure.33 The intent of Congress
was "to set forth explicitly the objectives which [Exemption 7]
is intended to achieve in order to assure that information is
withheld only if one of those objectives would be frustrated
were the information disclosed."34
Congress retained the threshold requirement that, to be ex-
empt, investigatory records must have been "compiled for law
enforcement purposes," but Congress did not expressly ad-
dress whether "unlawful" investigations could meet this re-
quirement. The legislative history on this question is
31. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 17025 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at
17046 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 34168 (remarks of Rep. Thompson); id.
at 36630 (remarks of Rep. Alexander).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in HOUSE
COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS AND SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th CONG.,
1st SEss., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502)
121, 122 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) (hereinafter cited as 1975 SOURCE BOOK);
H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK,
supra, at 8, 15. The Senate Judiciary Committee took a similar approach, find-
ing that "the primary obstacles to the Act's faithful implementation by the ex-
ecutive branch have been procedural rather than substantive." S. REP. No. 854,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE Boon, supra, at 153.
33. Senator Hart's initial proposal would have amended Exemption 7 to
read as follows:
Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere
with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair
trial or an impartial adjudication or constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, (C) disclose the identity of an informer,
or (D) disclose investigative techniques and procedures.
120 CONG. REC. 17033 (1974). Except for the addition of the "invasion of pri-
vacy" category, the Hart amendment was substantially the same as a proposal
of the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association. See id. at
17035. A conference committee amended the exemption without changing its
threshold requirements: (1) the word "clearly" was deleted from clause (B) of
Hart's amendment, thereby allowing nondisclosure for an "unwarranted inva-
sion of privacy"; (2) clause (C) was amended by substituting "confidential
source" for "informer" and allowing the withholding of confidential information
under narrowly drawn circumstances; and (3) a clause was added permitting
nondisclosure when "the life or physical safety of law enforcement personner
would be endangered. See CONFERENCE REPORT, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AMENDMENTs, S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1974) (L REP. No.
1380 identical), reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6290-92.
See generally text accompanying note 16 supra. A veto by President Ford was
easily overridden in both houses of Congress and the present Exemption 7 be-
came law effective February 19, 1975. Pub. L No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1561
(1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1976)).
34. 120 CONG. REC. 17035 (1974) (statement of John Miller, Chairman, Ad-
ministrative Law Section, American Bar Association (June 11, 1973)).
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inconclusive. During floor debate, Senator Weicker suggested
that the broader disclosure required under the Hart amend-
ment would help restrain "lawless elements" within the FBI.35
The FBI generally opposed the Hart amendment, insisting that
its investigatory files are compiled "for one purpose only, and
that is a law enforcement purpose."36 Senator Kennedy noted
that the amendment had "considerable sensitivity built in to
protect ... the legitimate interests of a law enforcement
agency to conduct an investigation into . . . crimes .. .
These comments notwithstanding, the 1974 Amendments did
not specifically confront the problem of illegal investigations,
thus giving the courts little guidance to determine when Ex-
emption 7 applies to information derived from such investiga-
tions.
B. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF EXEMPTION 7
Despite Congress' attempt to clarify the purposes of Ex-
emption 7, the courts have yet to establish clearly what consti-
tutes the threshold requirement of "law enforcement
purposes." Judicial confusion is due, in part, to the application
of Exemption 7 to all federal agencies-no distinction is made
between civil and criminal law enforcement responsibilities.3 8
35. Senator Weicker argued that although the amended Exemption 7
would
make the job of the law enforcement agencies more difficult in that it
brings them out into the open.... [t] he far greater danger lies behind
closed doors and in locked files. None of the abuses that we have seen
come out of this system would have happened if more people, more
eyes, more ears, had been on the scene ....
Id. at 17038.
36. Id. at 17036 (remarks of Sen. Hruska). The FBI feared that opening its
fies would cause information sources to dry up, thereby hindering its investi-
gative responsibilities. See id. at 17036-37 (remarks of Sen. Hruska and state-
ment of Sen. Thurmond).
37. Id. at 17040 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (emphasis added); see note 119
infra and accompanying text.
38. See Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d
73, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (FOIA request sought USDA report on Farmers Home
Administration practices of racial discrimination); Forrester v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 433 F. Supp. 987, 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (FOIA request sought nar-
rative report of Department of Labor regarding plaintiff's claim of age discrimi-
nation), affd mem., 591 F.2d 1330 (2d Cir. 1978); Green v. Kleindienst, 378 F.
Supp. 1397, 1400 (D.D.C. 1974) (FOIA request sought "business review" files of
Justice Department's Antitrust Division). Although much of the floor debate
on the amendment of Exemption 7 focused on its effect on the FBI, see 120
CONG. REc. 17033-40, 36867, 36871-72 (1974), the conference report indicated that
the exemption applied to both civil and criminal law enforcement agencies.
See S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974) (L REP. No. 1380 identical),
reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6291.
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The six specific grounds justifying nondisclosure under Exemp-
tion 7 are oriented predominantly toward criminal investiga-
tions,39 but the same threshold requirement applies to all
agencies and to both civil and criminal matters. Therefore, it is
not surprising that the standard employed by courts to define
"law enforcement purposes" has varied significantly, depending
in part on the type of agency involved.
1. Agencies with Mixed Administrative and Law Enforcement
Functions
Many agencies are charged with both civil law enforcement
duties and substantial administrative functions; it is sometimes
difficult to determine whether information gathered by such
agencies has been collected for "law enforcement purposes"
under the FOIA. The courts have employed two tests in mak-
ing this determination. One is the "pending proceeding" test,
under which records are exempted from disclosure if compiled
in connection with a formal enforcement proceeding.40 In
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,41 for example, the
Supreme Court held that "witness statements in pending un-
fair labor practice proceedings are exempt from FOIA disclo-
sure at least until completion of the Board's hearing."42 After
presuming that the requisite purpose attached to the formal
proceedings, the Court applied Exemption 7(A), the specific
subcategory that guards against interference with government
enforcement proceedings.43 The Court recognized, however,
that the 1974 FOIA Amendments were intended to eliminate
blanket exemptions for records characterized as "compiled for
law enforcement purposes";4 4 it therefore held that Exemption
7(A) applies only "whenever the Government's case in court-
a concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding-would be
harmed by the premature release of evidence or information." 45
39. The harms that Exemption 7 currently protects against are more likely
to occur in the criminal context. See generally text accompanying note 16
supra. One commentator has suggested that the 1974 amendments "did not ad-
equately respond to the need for a distinction between secrecy in the criminal
and in the non-criminal law enforcement contexts." See 2 J. O'REiLLY, supra
note 12, § 17.01, at 17-3.
40. See, e.g., Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 219 (3d
Cir. 1977); Kanter v. IRS, 433 F. Supp. 812, 817-18 (N.D. III. 1977).
41. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
42. Id. at 236.
43. See generally text accompanying note 16 supra.
44. 437 U.S. at 236.
45. Id. at 232 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 17033 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart)).
The Court also noted that Exemption 7(A) speaks in the plural voice about
[Vol. 65:11391146
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Although the basic premise of the "pending proceeding"
test is sound, the test gives no guidance in determining the
presence of "law enforcement purposes" when, for example, an
agency first commences an investigation, or when an investiga-
tion is terminated before any formal enforcement proceedings
are conducted. The test seems appropriate only when an
agency asserts that Exemption 7(A) harm-interference with
enforcement proceedings-would result from disclosure.4 6
A second test that courts have employed to determine
whether law enforcement purposes attach to a particular inves-
tigation is the "special intensity" test. This test distinguishes
routine inquiries concerning the administration, surveillance,
and oversight of federal programs from inquiries that focus di-
rectly and with "special intensity" on specific parties and al-
leged illegal acts.47 Once an investigation departs from the
routine, it is deemed to be conducted for law enforcement pur-
poses, regardless of whether an enforcement proceeding is ulti-
mately conducted.48 The "special intensity" test appears better
suited than the "pending proceeding" test to the determination
of whether the threshold requirement of Exemption 7 has been
met. The "special intensity" test protects an agency's legiti-
mate interest in investigating specific, suspected violations of
the law, yet also acknowledges that routine administrative in-
quiries often lack the "law enforcement purposes" required for
Exemption 7 protection. Moreover, the "special intensity" test
can be applied to virtually every type and stage of agency in-
vestigatory conduct.
2. The FBI
Because the FBI engages primarily in criminal law enforce-
ment activities, 49 most of its investigations are likely to be for
"enforcement proceedings," while Exemptions 7(B) through (D) refer to par-
ticular cases--"a person," "an unwarranted invasion," "a confidential source"-
and thus are not susceptible of interpretation as generic exemptions. 437 U.S.
at 223-24.
46. In Robbins, the existence of a pending formal proceeding before the
NLRB clearly demonstrated a valid law enforcement purpose. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's reluctance to disturb longstanding discovery rules in NLRB
proceedings, see 437 U.S. at 239, suggests that the result in Robbins might be
limited to the facts of that case.
47. See, e.g., Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498
F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Gregory v. FDIC, 470 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (D.D.C.
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
48. See, e.g., 498 F.2d at 81; 470 F. Supp. at 1334.
49. Under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1976), the FBI is responsible for
detecting and aiding in the prosecution of federal crimes, investigating other
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"law enforcement purposes." Moreover, since the FBI has a le-
gitimate interest not only in detecting crime, but also in
preventing crime, courts have recognized that "circumstances
may require that the FBI commence an investigation before
any specific violation has occurred."5 0 Most courts, therefore,
apply a less rigorous standard for determining "law enforce-
ment purposes" when it is the FBI, rather than an agency with
mixed functions, seeking the application of Exemption 7. To
meet the standard, the FBI has typically been required to show
only "a sufficient connection between the conduct of the inves-
tigation and legitimate concerns for maintaining national secur-
ity or preventing criminal activity,"5 1 or a "good faith belief that
the subject [of the investigation] may violate or has violated
federal law."52 In routine criminal investigations, the FBI can
usually make this showing to the court through detailed affida-
vits or oral testimony.53
It seems appropriate to apply a less exacting standard to
matters under the control of the Departments of Justice and State, and assist-
ing in the protection of the President. The FBI also performs some administra-
tive functions: collecting crime records, see 5 U.S.C. § 534 (1976), providing
training for state and local law enforcement personnel, see 42 U.S.C. § 3774
(Supp. 1I 1979), and conducting background investigations of presidential ap-
pointees and some other federal employees, see 5 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. I 1979).
50. Ramo v. Department of the Navy, 487 F. Supp. 127, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
51. Id.
52. Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
53. See, e.g., Ramo v. Department of the Navy, 487 F. Supp. 127, 130 (N.D.
Cal. 1979). Self-serving declarations and conclusory allegations normally will
not suffice to establish the applicability of a claimed exemption. See, e.g., Irons
v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1979); Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States
Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 82 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1974); cf. Weissman v. CIA,
565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (possibility that some government affidavits
may be untruthful or "some bits of non-exempt material may be found among
exempt material [is not] enough to trigger an in camera investigation by the
court"). In a case involving classified documents under Exemption 1, however,
"substantial weight" is given to the agent's affidavit. See Weissman v. CIA, 565
F.2d 692, 697 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bell v. United States, 563 F.2d 484, 487 (lst Cir.
1977). Where the agency's affidavit is insufficient, courts have frequently re-
quired the agency to prepare an itemization of the records withheld, a detailed
justification for its claims of exemption, and an index cross-referencing the
itemization and justification. First developed by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit to ease the burden on the courts and to give plain-
tiffs the information necessary to challenge the agency characterization of
records without jeopardizing the confidentiality of the disputed documents, see
Vaughan v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977
(1974), this procedure has since received widespread approval. See, e.g., Olles-
tad v. Kelley, 573 F.2d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1978); Seafarers Int'l Union v.
Baldovin, 508 F.2d 125, 129, vacated as moot, 511 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1975). If the
court is still not satisfied, it may examine the documents in camera to deter-
mine whether "such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of
the exemptions." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1976).
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the FBI. Because the FBI is involved primarily with criminal
law enforcement, the standard usually does not result in an in-
accurate determination of the purpose behind a particular in-
vestigation, nor does it place undue demands on FBI and
judicial resources. Moreover, the standard protects the FBI's
ability to act swiftly to prevent crimes before they fully unfold.
Perhaps the most important policies behind the less exact-
ing standard arise from the distinction between criminal and
civil law enforcement. Although the operational necessity to
keep certain law enforcement activities confidential is present
in both civil and criminal cases, the danger of disclosure is ar-
guably greater in the criminal context.54 Inadvertent disclo-
sure5 5 of a criminal law enforcement record, for example,
seems more likely to risk physical harm to, or intimidation of,
witnesses and informants than does the inadvertent disclosure
of a civil law enforcement record.56 On the other hand, because
criminal law enforcement agencies are afforded great discretion
in their role as protectors of society, the public is justified in
seeking assurance that the agencies' methods and goals of in-
vestigation are proper.7
III. "UNLAWFUIL" FBI INVESTIGATIONS
The clash between the accessibility objective of the FOIA
and the secrecy objective of the FBI can best be understood af-
ter consideration of both the scope of past FBI unlawfulness
and the deterrents to such conduct.
A. THE SCOPE OF ABUSES
In stark contrast to its more exemplary record in the area
54. See 2 J. O'RELy, supra note 12, § 17.01, at 17-2 to -4.
55. The great number of FOIA and Privacy Act information requests re-
ceived by the FBI creates a risk that some information tending to identify confi-
dential sources may be inadvertently released. Each document requested must
be examined line by line to determine whether the information contained
therein is exempt. In fiscal year 1978, 368 employees were needed to process
over 18,000 FOIA requests, at a total cost of over $9 million. See Impact of the
Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act on Intelligence Activities:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the House Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1979).
56. See 2 J. O'REmLY, supra note 12, § 17.01, at 17-4 to -1. Fifteen percent
of all FOIA requests made to the FBI in fiscal year 1979 were made by or on
behalf of prisoners. See Librach v. FBI, 587 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1978) (federal
prisoner sought information about the witness resettlement program of the
Justice Department); Webster, An FBI Viewpoint Regarding the Freedom of In-
formation Act, 7 J. LEGIS. 7, 12 (1980).
57. See 2 J. O'REHLY, supra note 12, § 17.01, at 17-3 & n.6.
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of general criminal law enforcement, the FBI has a consistent
record of abuse of power in the area of domestic intelligence.
Following a period of repressive activity during and after the
First World War,58 the FBI's domestic intelligence unit was first
abolished in 1924, then renewed under a presidential directive
in 1936.59 The next forty years "witnessed a relentless expan-
sion of domestic intelligence activity beyond investigation of
criminal conduct toward the collection of political intelligence
and the launching of secret offensive actions against Ameri-
cans."60 By 1975, the FBI had compiled over 500,000 domestic
intelligence files, 65,000 of which had been opened in 1972
alone.61
The FBI's re-entry into domestic intelligence in 1936 was a
result of public concern over foreign threats and "subversive
activities"-a concern that continued through World War II and
expanded in the 1950s to include domestic groups thought to be
under Communist influence. 62 Many FBI investigations under-
taken during this period were later found to have had "no con-
ceivable rational relationship to either national security or
violent activity."63 Indeed, in light of the FBI investigations
during the 1960s of civil rights groups and anti-war activists,
many commentators have been compelled to conclude that an
implicit purpose of FBI domestic intelligence has been to pre-
serve the existing social and political order.64 More recent indi-
58. See SENATE SELECT Comm. TO STUDy GovERNmENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTrvrrxEs, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 755, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., Book III at 389 (1976) (hereinafter cited as CHURCH COMM. RE-
PORT). The anti-radical hysteria following World War I culminated in the infa-
mous "Palmer Raids" of 1920, when federal agents rounded up over 10,000
suspected "anarchists" in one night. Id. at 383-85.
59. Id. at 392.
60. Id., Book ]7 at 21.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 21-22. During the "Red Scare" of the 1950s, the FBI maintained a
list of at least 26,000 individuals who were to be rounded up in case of a na-
tional emergency. Id. at 7. From 1940 to 1966, the FBI opened and photo-
graphed at least 130,000 first-class letters in eight U.S. cities. Id. at 6. During
the height of domestic intelligence abuses in the late 1960s and 1970s, the FBI,
the CIA, the IRS, and the Army all participated in the investigation of Ameri-
cans who held disfavored political views. Id. at 6-7.
63. Id., Book II at 7.
64. See, e.g., id. at 6-7. Between 1960 and 1974, the FBI conducted over
500,000 separate investigations of persons and groups who fell within the FBI's
"subversive" category, predicating the investigations on the possibility that
such persons or groups might overthrow the government. Yet, since 1957, there
has not been a single prosecution under the laws prohibiting advocacy of over-
throwing the government. See id., Book 11 at 19. Only 1.3% of the over 17,000
FBI domestic intelligence investigations conducted in 1974 resulted in the pros-
ecution and conviction of any crime, while only 2% of all the domestic intelli-
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cations of such a purpose include the "Plumbers" unit and
"enemies list" established under President Nixon's Administra-
tion.65
For FOIA purposes, an FBI investigation may be consid-
ered "unlawful" if, from the outset, its objective is not related
to enforcing or preventing the violation of a federal law. An in-
vestigation may also be deemed "unlawful" if it extends in time
beyond any violation-oriented pretext that might plausibly
have sparked it, or it reaches "targets" that have no reasonable
link to the violation-oriented focus. 66
The fear of "Communist infiltration," for example, has led
to a number of long-standing political investigations. Although
such "infiltration" alone is not a crime, the NAACP was investi-
gated on this pretext for twenty-five years, despite the FBI's
knowledge from a field office report submitted in the first year
of the investigation that "there is a strong tendency for the
NAACP to steer clear of Communistic activities."67 The Social-
ist Workers Party (SWP) was under similar investigation for at
least thirty-six years,68 despite the FBI's concession that, since
shortly after the Party's formation, the Party "has not commit-
ted any violent acts, nor have its expressions 'constituted an in-
dictable incitement to violence."' 69 The fear of basic social or
political change, without any credible pretext of a law violation,
has led to many other investigations. Following Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr.'s "I Have A Dream" speech in 1963, for example,
the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division concluded that he was
the "most dangerous ... Negro leader in the country,"7 0
gence investigations yielded advance knowledge of any kind of political
activity-legal or illegal. Id.
65. See id., Book II at 116-17, 121-22, 225-32, 235-40; T. WHrrE, BREACH OF
FArrH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 149-53 (1975).
66. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1976) (exempting "investigatory records com-
piled for law enforcement purposes" from FOIA disclosure provisions under
specified conditions) (emphasis added); 5 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. EI 1979) (FBI
may conduct background investigations on some prospective federal employ-
ees); 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1976) (FBI may detect and help prosecute federal crimes);
CH RCH CoMM. REPORT, supra note 58, Book 11 at 297 (concluding that FBI
should not engage in any domestic security activity unless authorized by stat-
ute). See generally FBI Charter Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1612 Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary (Parts 1 & 2), 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1979-1980);
FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
67. CHURCH CoMM. REPORT, supra note 58, Book III at 416; see id. at 450,
483.
68. The FBI claims that it terminated its investigation of the SWP in 1976.
See Paton v. LaPrade, 471 F. Supp. 166, 174 n.7 (D.N.J. 1979).
69. CmmcH CoMM. REPORT, supra note 58, Book III at 251.
70. Id. at 109.
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prompting an intensive five-year FBI campaign of surveillance
and harassment designed to neutralize and discredit Dr.
King.7 1 Virtually all major civil rights and antiwar groups of
the 1960s were either put under surveillance or subjected to
harassing counter-intelligence techniques.7 2 Even the "Wo-
men's Liberation Movement" was infiltrated by informants who
reported on the Movement's policies and on the personal lives
of its leaders and members.7 3
These "unlawful purpose" cases illustrate how the FBI's fo-
cus on preventing political violence has resulted in a scope of
intelligence activity so broad that it inevitably reaches virtually
all vigorous dissenters. This focus has also resulted in intelli-
gence investigations being initiated without reasonable suspi-
cion that a criminal act has been, is being, or will soon be
committed. Moreover, because those responsible for such in-
vestigations have often seemed unable to distinguish between
criminal conduct and constitutionally protected advocacy and
association,7 4 some investigations have been continued for too
long.
In addition to having conducted investigations serving no
lawful purpose, the FBI has also unreasonably extended the
scope of its investigation, and has employed illegal or improper
tactics such as unauthorized wiretapping, "black-bag" jobs,
mail-opening, "snitch-jacketing," anonymous mailings, dissemi-
nation of derogatory information, and interference with judicial
process.75 The counter-intelligence program (COINTELPRO)
that focused on the Ku Klux Klan is perhaps the most promi-
nent example of such a case. The Klan COINTELPRO began in
1964, when responsibility for the "development of informants
and gathering of intelligence on the KKK" was transferred
from the FBI's General Investigative Division to the Domestic
71. See id. at 104-84.
72. See id. at 23-27. Targets of the counter-intelligence program
(COINTELPRO) that the FBI directed at the New Left included the SDS, all of
Antioch College, and students who carried protest signs that had obscene
words written on them. Id. at 5. The FBI terminated its COINTELPRO in
April, 1971, following publicity stemming from a burglary of its Media, Penn-
sylvania offices. The pilfered documents indicated that 40% of the total of FBI
activities pertained to political surveillance and that the New Left COINTEL-
PRO was designed to "enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles [by get-
ting] the point across [that] there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox." P.
CowAN, N. EGLESON & N. HENToFF, STATE SECRETS 139 (1974); see CHURcn
Comm. REPORT, supra note 58, Book III at 3 n.l.
73. See CHURcn COMM. REPORT, supra note 58, Book 11 at 7, Book III at 250.
74. See id., Book IlI at 27-28.
75. Id. at 43-59, 271-371, 525-677.
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Intelligence Division.76 This shift reflected a judgment by some
in the FBI that traditional law enforcement methods were not
adequate to stop the Klan's involvement in the harassment and
murder of civil rights workers.77 Although some elements of
the Klan were properly under investigation for their violent ac-
tivities, the "investigation" included now-standard counter-in-
telligence techniques 78 and even the participation of paid FBI
informants in violent Klan activities. 79 Moreover, the scope of
the investigation gradually expanded to include investigation of
many groups lawfully exercising political opposition to such
policies as integration or school busing.8 0
Even more grievous tactics were employed by the FBI in
its Black Nationalist COINTELPRO, which focused on the
Black Panther Party.81 Although some members of the
Panthers were properly under investigation, 82 the "investiga-
tion" included the use of tactics that were clearly designed to
foster violence between the Panthers and other armed black
groups, and, ultimately, to destroy the Black Panther Party.83
Anonymous mailings were used to create dissension within the
Party and drive away support for its more positive programs,
such as its "Breakfast for Children" program.84
B. DETERRENTS TO ABUSES
An obvious deterrent to abuses of power by the FBI would
be a statutory charter that clearly defines the FBI's investiga-
tive responsibilities. Although a myriad of hearings and re-
ports have addressed the issue of FBI abuses in recent years,85
Congress has yet to enact such a charter.8 6 Other deterrents to
FBI abuses include private damages actions and public pres-
sure, both of which are facilitated by the FOIA.
When the FBI abuses its investigatory powers, an individ-
ual conceivably has at least three causes of action against the
76. Id. at 18.
77. Id. at 18 n.81.
78. Id. at 45, 51-52, 59.
79. Id. at 239-44.
80. Id. at 474.
81. Id. at 185-223.
82. See, e.g., id. at 246, 249.
83. Id. at 188-98.
84. Id. at 210.
85. See id., Book VI at 293-308 (bibliography of materials on the evolution
of the federal intelligence function).
86. Several bills have been introduced in the last two years, but not one
has emerged from committee. See, e.g., FBI Charter Act of 1979, S. 1612: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1980).
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federal government or its agents. First, the individual might
bring an action against a federal employee for damages result-
ing from a "constitutional tort" within the meaning of Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents,8 7 in which the Supreme Court
held that federal agents could be sued for violating an individ-
ual's fourth amendment rights. 88 Courts have extended Bivens
to provide relief for other constitutional violations,89 but the
scope of such actions remains unclear.90 Second, the individual
might bring, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),9' an
action against the federal government to recover for a federal
employee's tort. To recover, however, such a tort must have
been within the scope of employment and "under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would
[have been] liable to the claimant" under state law.92 Also, be-
cause constitutional torts are a product of federal law for which
there is usually no common law analogue, there will often be
no cause of action under the FTCA for FBI abuses. 93 Moreover,
the FTCA does not abrogate the sovereign immunity of the
United States with respect to suits for libel, slander, misrepre-
sentation, or deceit 9 4-- torts that often occur in connection with
FBI counterintelligence activities.95 Finally, the individual
might bring an action against the government under the Pri-
87. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Unlike state government officials, who can be sued
for violating an individual's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp.
II 1979), federal officials are not subject to similar statutory liability. Prior to
Bivens, no damage action was available against federal officials.
88. 403 U.S. at 397.
89. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979) (fifth amendment);
Turpin v. Mallet, 579 F.2d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 1978) (fourteenth amendment); Del-
lums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (first amendment), cert. de-
nied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144,
162 (D.D.C. 1976) (sixth amendment); Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737, 740
(EX). Ill. 1975) (eighth amendment).
90. Moreover, under Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), a federal em-
ployee may be entitled to qualified immunity in such an action. See id. at 507.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
92. Id.
93. To the extent that a plaintiff can assert a common law tort claim based
on the law of the forum state, the United States may be held liable. See, e.g.,
Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 323-26 (2d Cir. 1978) (government held
liable to plaintiffs, whose mail had been opened and read by the CIA, on an in-
vasion of privacy theory based on state law). There is no clear common law
analogue, however, for infringement of the right to free speech or for denial of a
person's right to be free from unlawful discrimination by the federal govern-
ment under the fifth amendment. Thus, in these latter cases the plaintiff must
resort to the Bivens type of action. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236
(1979).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
95. See notes 67-84 supra and accompanying text.
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vacy Act of 1974.96 Section (e) (7) of the Privacy Act bars agen-
cies from maintaining any records concerning an individual's
exercise of first amendment rights unless such recordkeeping
is "expressly authorized by statute or . . . pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity."97
To state a cause of action for damages under the Act, however,
a plaintiff must demonstrate an "adverse effect" that has re-
sulted from the agency's failure to comply with the statute.9 8
Because such harm is often of an intangible nature, this cause
of action will usually be of limited utility.
Assuming that these causes of action offer the plaintiff an
adequate scope of discovery and adequate recovery,9 9 there is
still a significant hurdle for the prospective plaintiff to con-
sider-standing to sue. Courts have uniformly followed the
standing doctrine announced in Laird v. Tatum,0 0 in which the
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had no standing to chal-
lenge the mere existence of an Army surveillance program:
"Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substi-
tute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm."' 0 Because prospective plaintiffs are not
always aware that they are the target of intrusive intelligence
tactics, FOIA disclosures often play an essential role in re-
vealing, and later establishing, the presence of objective
harm. 02
In addition to facilitating private damage actions, the FOIA
provides a strong deterrent to FBI political abuses through the
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
97. Id. §552a(e)(7).
98. See id. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
99. In fact, damage awards are often minimal and limited to proof of actual
damages. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254, 267 (1978); Halperin v.
Kissinger, 434 F. Supp. 1193, 1194-95 (D.D.C. 1977); of. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (4)
(1976) (Privacy Act liability shall be equal to actual damages, but in no case
less than $1,000 plus costs and attorney fees). Once discovery is permitted, its
scope is usually adequate to prove the plaintiff's case. See, e.g., In re Attorney
General, 596 F.2d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 1979).
100. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
101. Id. at 13-14; see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). Plaintiffs in Laird sought injunctive relief
against overt surveillance activities. Although such relief has occasionally been
granted by a lower court, this type of suit has rarely survived on appeal. See,
e.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 510 F.2d 253, 256-57 (2d Cir.),
rev'g 387 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y.), stay denied, 419 U.S. 1314 (1974) (Marshall,
Circuit Justice).
102. For example, in Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978),
the federal government was held liable to parties whose mail had been opened
and read by the CIA, id. at 321, 323; it was only through a FOIA request that the
plaintiffs learned of the tampering with their mail, id. at 334.
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public disclosure of information. Although the scope of discov-
ery in private damage actions may be limited by need, materi-
ality, or relevance, FOIA disclosure "to any person" may be
limited only by the specific exemptions in the Act. Grounded
on the theory that the public has a right to know what its gov-
ernment is doing and that public knowledge is the surest deter-
rent to a repeat of the political abuses of the past,103 the 1974
FOIA Amendments were clearly intended to increase public ac-
cess to "law enforcement" records, except when specifically de-
fined harms would result. Thus, in addition to affected parties,
journalists and other "public watchdogs" are able to assert
FOIA provisions to promote the public's interest in overseeing
the FBI's exercise of its sweeping investigatory power.
C. JuDIcIAL APPUCATION OF THE FOIA TO "UNLAWFUL"
INVESTIGATIONS
When confronted with FOIA requests for information de-
rived from "unlawful" FBI investigations, courts have taken
one of two approaches. Some courts have held that FBI
records are per se "compiled for law enforcement purposes";
others have used a more formalistic method of analysis, making
their determination upon the basis of whether the documents
at issue are (1) investigatory records and (2) related to a law
enforcement purpose. In many circumstances, both of these
approaches are inadequate.
The per se approach is illustrated by Irons v. Bell 0 4 and
Kuehnert v. FBI,105 which both held that records of a criminal
law enforcement agency are "compiled for law enforcement
purposes" even if gathered in connection with.the illegal sur-
veillance of political activities. 10 6 In Irons, the plaintiff was a
former student activist, civil rights organizer, and draft resister.
Upon his request for all FBI material relating to himself, the
FBI released portions of its files, but withheld material pertain-
ing to the plaintiffs past association with several political
groups.107 The FBI asserted that Exemption 7 applied, arguing
that disclosure would tend to reveal the identity of a confiden-
tial source. 10 8 In Kuehnert, the plaintiff, who had been arrested
103. See notes 31, 35, 37 supra and accompanying text.
104. 596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1979).
105. 620 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1980).
106. See note 110 infra and accompanying text.
107. 596 F.2d at 469-70.
108. Id. at 470; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (D) (1976) (exempting investigatory
records compiled for law enforcement purposes "only to the extent that the
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but not convicted for "protest activities," also made a request
for FBI material relating to himself, and, as in Irons, the FBI
released only some of its files.109 The FBI withheld the names
of confidential sources, all information that would tend to re-
veal the identity of a particular confidential source, the names
of third parties asserted to be "of investigative interest," as well
as the names of FBI special agents and other law enforcement
officers involved in the investigations." 0
In Irons, the First Circuit could find no "FBI obligation to
conduct a lengthy investigation and infiltration of [plaintiff's]
political and religious associations;""' in Kuehnert, the Eighth
Circuit found a valid law enforcement purpose for investigating
one organization linked to the plaintiff, but could not "discern
any threshold connection between the [other] organization [s]
and activities being investigated and violations of federal
law."112 Both courts nonetheless held that, when it is the FBI
that has conducted the investigation, the purpose of the investi-
gation is irrelevant:
The character of the materials excluded under Exemption 7 at least
suggests that 'law enforcement purposes' is as much a description of
the type of agency the exemption is aimed at as it is a condition on the
use of the exemption by agencies having administrative as well as civil
enforcement duties.1 1 3
Both courts cited four additional policy reasons to support their
broad construction of the "law enforcement purposes" require-
ment of Exemption 7, finding that a different decision: (1)
"would cost ... society the cooperation of those who give the
FBI information under an express assurance of confidentiality";
(2) would result in the release of information otherwise ex-
empted, causing one or more of the harms Congress sought to
guard against; (3) would not deter illegal FBI activity; and (4)
would force upon district courts "an unmanageable burden...
to second ... guess the judgment of [the FBI] that an investi-
production of such records would... disclose the identity of a confidential
source").
109. The FBI released documents indicating that Kuehnert had been inves-
tigated regarding his connection with a group known as the Revolutionary
Union, and also released documents indicating the plans for violence that this
organization may have had. The FBI also revealed that other organizations
with which Kuehnert was associated had been infiltrated and investigated. See
620 F.2d at 664.
110. Id. at 665.
111. 596 F.2d at 472.
112. 620 F.2d at 666.
113. Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d at 474; see Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d at 666.
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gation was warranted.""14
The Irons and Kuehnert decisions, representing the fur-
thest reach of judicial deference to the FBI in the context of
Exemption 7, appear unsound on several grounds. First, as a
matter of statutory construction, the special category for the
FBI created by the per se rule seems contrary to congressional
intent. Although Exemption 7 is predominantly oriented to-
ward criminal law enforcement, 15 it does not follow that Con-
gress intended to exclude criminal enforcement agencies from
the threshold requirement of showing that withheld documents
were collected for "law enforcement purposes." Indeed, the
creation of Exemption 7(D), which pertains to certain criminal
intelligence and national security investigations,116 suggests
that Congress recognized the problem of unlawful intelligence
investigations, and intended that the product of such investiga-
tions would not be exempt from disclosure."17 This interpreta-
tion is supported by legislative history suggesting that the
Exemption 7 subcategories are narrow exceptions to a broad
policy favoring disclosure-the exceptions being designed to
protect only "the legitimate interests of a law enforcement
agency.""18 Presumably, the FBI has no legitimate interest in
shielding information regarding activities that the FBI has no
lawful authority to investigate."19
114. Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d at 474; see Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d at 666 n. 9
(citing Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d at 474).
115. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
116. Exemption 7(D) permits withholding of "the identity of a confidential
source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting
a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information
furnished only by the confidential source." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (D) (1976) (em-
phasis added). At no other point does the statutory language of Exemption 7
indicate a legislative preference for differential treatment of FBI investigatory
records.
117. See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 334 n.29 (2d Cir. 1978).
118. 120 CONG. REC. 17040 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (emphasis ad-
ded).
119. See Stern v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (D.D.C. 1973); 120
CONG. REC. 36867 (1974) (Sen. Kennedy commenting on a FOIA request con-
cerning the FBI's COINTELPRO: "(T]his is... precisely the kind of Govern-
ment activity which the public has the greatest interest in knowing about").
Even the Irons court conceded that the mere exercise of one's first amendment
rights in opposition to some government policy does not trigger any legitimate
FBI interest. See 596 F.2d at 472. Although the government may have no inter-
est in protecting the flow of information regarding activities for which there is
no lawful authority to investigate, of, Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 695 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (CIA has no lawful authority to conduct domestic investigations; Ex-
emption 7 inapplicable), a confidential source may have interests to protect.
See notes 148-56 infra and accompanying text.
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Second, the general policy underlying the protection of
confidential sources--to enlarge the flow of information to the
final federal enforcement agency by protecting informers
against risks of reprisal or loss of privacy"120-is given undue
emphasis by the approach taken in Irons and Kuehnert. The
risk of serious harm to informers can be taken into account
without adopting a per se threshold rule.121 Moreover, Con-
gress clearly did not intend to provide absolute protection for
"confidential sources": the conference report on the FOIA 1974
Amendments indicates that Exemption 7 may protect the iden-
tity of informants only in instances "where the investigatory
records [now] sought were compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses."'122 Because the protection of sources under Exemption
7 is premised on the assumption that the investigation was un-
dertaken pursuant to valid law enforcement purposes, the con-
fidentiality rationale does not justify a rule that confers the
requisite '"purpose" upon all FBI investigations, lawful or un-
lawful.
Third, the assertion by the courts in Irons and Kuehnert
that full exposure of an investigation's unlawfulness will not
deter the FBI from illegal investigations' 23 is contradicted by
the courts' other assertion that the loss of Exemption 7 protec-
tion will cost society the cooperation of informants. If the latter
is true, as the FBI's vigor in shielding such information might
suggest, it follows that full disclosure will at least make unlaw-
ful investigations more difficult to conduct. In any event, full
disclosure as a deterrent is precisely the objective behind the
FOIA.124
Finally, the contention that requiring the FBI to demon-
strate a law enforcement purpose places an unmanageable bur-
den on district courts seems to beg the question. The burden,
even if substantial, is imposed by the FOIA.125 Indeed, several
120. Sands v. Murphy, 633 F.2d 968, 970 (1st Cir. 1980); see Wellman Indus.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974); Fran-
kel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
121. See text accompanying notes 143-56 infra.
122. S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974) (H. REP. No. 1380 identi-
cal), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6291.
123. See Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d at 474.
124. See text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
125. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1976) (providing for in camera inspection
and de novo review by the district courts). In a similar context, the Supreme
Court has concluded.
We cannot accept the Government's argument that internal security
matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts reg-
ularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society.... If the
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district courts have demonstrated their willingness and ability
to manage the task.12 6
Thus far, the only judicial alternative to the per se rule is a
more literal, formalistic interpretation of Exemption 7, such as
that adopted in Abramson v. FBI127 by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. In Abramson, the plaintiff
was a professional journalist who sought information regarding
the extent to which the Nixon Administration "may have used
the FBI and its files to obtain derogatory information about
political opponents and those that it perceived as enemies."128
The FBI, granting plaintiff's request only in part, withheld doc-
uments containing "information requested by and transmitted
to the Nixon White House concerning eleven individuals" who
had been "prominently associated with liberal causes and/or
... opposition to the war in Indochina. 129 The FBI based its
withholding on Exemption 7 (C), relating to unwarranted inva-
sions of privacy.130 The Abramson court held that "any consid-
eration of whether disclosure would constitute an 'unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy' is premature until the documents
in issue have been shown by the Government" to meet the
threshold requirements of Exemption 7.131 The court inter-
preted Exemption 7 as requiring a showing that the requested
documents (1) are investigatory records, and (2) were com-
piled for law enforcement purposes.132 The FBI based its "law
enforcement" assertion on the "special security and appoint-
ment functions" of the White House;133 but because the FBI
was unable to relate those "broad and general duties to the in-
dividuals about whom information was requested," the court
found no law enforcement purpose and held Exemption 7 inap-
threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers
to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there is
probable cause for surveillance.
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972).
126. See, e.g., Ramo v. Department of the Navy, 487 F. Supp. 127, 130-32 (N.D.
Cal. 1979); Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 773-80 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Stern v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1317, 1321 (D.D.C. 1973).
127. No. 79-2500 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 24, 1980).
128. Id., slip op. at 4.
129. Id. at 9.
130. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
131. Abrahamson v. FBI, slip op. at 11-12. The court held that the purpose
of the compilation was not transformed from one that was political to one of
legitimate law enforcement simply because the documents had been compiled
at the request of the White House. Id. at 7-9, 19.
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id. at 9.
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plicable.13 4
In contrast to the courts in Irons and Kuehnert, the Abram-
son court did not focus on the conflict in the underlying poli-
cies of Exemption 7, but rather on the plain meaning of the
statute. Although it resurrected earlier interpretations of the
words "investigatory" and "law enforcement purposes,"135 the
court acknowledged the congressional disapproval of the ear-
lier per se approach,' 36 and held that, once the threshold re-
quirements of Exemption 7 have been met, "the next question
is whether release of the material would involve one of the six
types of harm specified in clauses (A) through (F) of amended
exemption 7"137
Although the formal analysis in Abramson is supported by
a plain reading of the statute, the underlying harm from disclo-
sure in Abramson was not as great as that in Irons or Kuehn-
ert. The documents released in Abramson were "name
checks," summaries of information from FBI files on certain
" public personalities," some of whom were either holders of, or
candidates for, federal elective office.' 38 As "public personali-
ties" these individuals arguably had a lesser privacy interest139
than the confidential sources and other persons about whom
information was withheld in Irons and Kuehnert.40 In addi-
tion, the risk of harm to third parties following disclosure was
less in Abramson than in Irons and Kuehnert. Because of its
factual basis, Abramson is noteworthy more for its formal anal-
134. Id.
135. Abramson implicitly recognizes that, despite the apparent discrediting
of the pre-1974 D.C. Circuit cases interpreting Exemption 7, see notes 23-30
supra and accompanying text, the carryover of some of the language in the
1974 Amendments imparts some precedential value to the pre-amendment
cases interpreting the words "investigatory" and "compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes." Without explicitly stating so, the court's analysis focused on
the purpose for which the files were compiled. See Rural Hous. Alliance v.
United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
136. See notes 23-30 supra and accompanying text.
137. Abramson v. FBI, slip op. at 11 (quoting Attorney General's Memoran-
dum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, reprinted in
1975 SOURCE BOOK supra note 32, at 516-17) (emphasis in original). The D.C.
Circuit's earlier per se rule was far more effective in protecting an individual's
right to privacy, albeit inadvertently, because the exemption was held to attach
indefinitely once it was determined that the investigatory file had been com-
piled for law enforcement purposes. See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying
text.
138. Abramson v. FBI, slip op. at 3, 5.
139. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 455-65 (1977);
Common Cause v. National Archives and Records Serv., 628 F.2d 179, 184 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
140. See Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d at 666-67; Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d at 476.
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ysis of the threshold requirements of Exemption 7 than for a
resolution of the conflict between the underlying values of
FOIA and Exemption 7.
A lingering problem with the approach taken in Abramson
is the possibility of releasing sensitive information that could
result in one or more of the harms specified in Exemption 7.
The most serious of these harms would be to the privacy and
safety interests of informers, confidential sources, and law en-
forcement personnel, and to the privacy of parties investigated
when an unaffected party requests disclosure. Indeed, it is the
difficulty of resolving, on a case-by-case basis, conflicts that
arise in balancing the benefits and harms of disclosure that ac-
counts for use of the per se rule. Considerations of judicial
economy do not, however, justify the use of the rule. As the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co. 141 indicates, agency claims of exemption based on
Exemption 7 should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.142
Moreover, in not following the per se rule, a court can be more
faithful to the disclosure objectives of the FOIA while still pro-
tecting against serious risks of harm.
IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Neither the approach taken in Irons and Kuehnert, nor the
approach taken in Abramson, satisfactorily resolves the Ex-
emption 7 problems associated with unlawful FBI investiga-
tions. Reflecting an all-or-nothing approach, the per se rule of
Irons and Kuehnert shields information that, if disclosed,
would deter FBI misconduct and facilitate private remedies,
while the formalistic Abramson approach risks disclosure that
might result in serious harm. A better approach would most
often provide for disclosure, while allowing a court discretion to
protect against the serious risk of harm.
From the outset, the FBI-like any agency asserting an ex-
emption under the FOIA-bears the burden of demonstrating
that an exemption applies to documents that have been with-
held from a requestor.143 Courts should recognize at this
threshold that the FBI has a legitimate interest both in
preventing crimes not yet fully consummated and in detecting
those already committed, and should give somewhat more def-
erence to FBI claims under Exemption 7 than to the claims of
141. 437 U.S. 214 (1978); see notes 41-45 supra and accompanying text.
142. See 437 U.S. at 232; note 45 supra and accompanying text.
143. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1976).
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civil law enforcement agencies. Rather than being required to
show that a particular investigation was focused on a specific
violation of the law, as under the "special intensity" test, the
FBI should be required to show only that its investigation was
based on some legitimate law enforcement purpose.14 4 Such a
purpose should be "violation-oriented"--it should focus on the
prevention or discovery of noncompliance with specific federal
statutes or regulations. This "violation-oriented" approach, by
allowing the FBI to undertake an investigation before any spe-
cific violation of the law occurs, recognizes the interest of the
FBI in preventing crime; it also, however, requires a good faith
belief by the FBI, based on reasonable suspicion, that a viola-
tion is likely to occur.
Under the proposed "violation-oriented" approach, the FBI
would continue to satisfy its threshold burden in "routine"
criminal cases with only a minimal showing, typically by pro-
viding affidavits or oral testimony describing the purpose of the
particular investigation.145 In most Exemption 7 cases, the con-
troversy is not whether the investigatory records were com-
piled for law enforcement purposes, but whether their release
would result in one of the six harms specified in the statute.
Requiring only a minimal showing of the "lawful purpose" of
an investigation appears to be sound from an empirical stand-
point because most FBI investigations, domestic intelligence
notwithstanding, are conducted for lawful purposes.
When confronted with a colorable assertion that a particu-
lar investigation is unlawful, however, courts would more vigor-
ously scrutinize the FBI's ability to meet the threshold
requirements of Exemption 7 under the proposed approach.
The FBI's burden in "unlawful" cases will usually not be sus-
ceptible to a bright line test of whether a law enforcement pur-
pose has been pursued. In most fact situations, the FBI will be
able to demonstrate some plausible law enforcement purpose,
but will have extended its investigation beyond a reasonable
period of time or to a range of "targets" that are linked only
tenuously to the original lawful purpose.146 There is little value
in drawing arbitrary or controversial lines around the concept
of "lawful purpose." Instead, courts should first examine the
nexus between a given record or document and the asserted
144. See Ramo v. Department of the Navy, 487 F. Supp. 127, 131 (N.D. CaL
1979); text accompanying note 37 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
146. See text accompanying notes 58-84 supra.
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lawful purpose, and then consider whether disclosure would re-
sult in one of the six harms specified under Exemption 7.
When there is a close nexus between the record and the inves-
tigation's lawful purpose, any reasonable showing of harm
under Exemption 7 should warrant withholding the document.
On the other hand, when the nexus between the records and
the lawful purpose is weak or highly tenuous-a "minimal
nexus"-then disclosure should follow, barring exceptional risk
of serious harm to third parties.147 This approach confers con-
siderable discretion on the courts, requiring them to weigh the
benefits and risks of disclosure. Before addressing concerns
that might arise in regard to such discretion, it is useful to con-
sider how the approach would operate in practice.
One recurring fact scenario has involved the investigation
of a violent political group such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Black
Panther Party, or the Weather Underground. Such an investi-
gation almost always originates with a violation-oriented focus,
but often expands into the realm of illegality.148 Under the pro-
posed approach, the risk from revealing the identity of inform-
ers and confidential sources in such an investigation, which can
be great, is weighed against the nexus between the source and
the lawful, violation-oriented purpose of the investigation. The
approach recognizes, for example, that an undercover inform-
ant who has infiltrated a violent political group faces greater
risks from disclosure than does a confidential source who has
only monitored political rallies, and that the undercover in-
formant is more closely linked to the investigation's lawful pur-
pose. Such a case-by-case examination can promote maximum
disclosure without running the risk of serious harm. Some
sources will, of course, have mixed roles, but whether to dis-
close the identity of these sources can effectively be treated
under a "worst case" assumption of potential harm.
Another scenario has involved standard counterintelligence
tactics, which frequently have little nexus with a violation-ori-
ented investigation. Employer interviews and anonymous mail-
ings, for example, have been used to disseminate derogatory
information about a "target" in an effort to discredit the person
147. Occasionally an investigation will be wholly unlawful from its outset
through its duration. In such a case, the entire record should be disclosed bar-
ring the most exceptional of circumstances.
For a similar argument in favor of judicial discretion to refuse enforcement
of the FOIA in cases where disclosure would have a strong adverse impact, see
Note, supra note 12, at 911-20.
148. See text accompanying notes 75-84 supra.
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politically, socially, or professionally. Such tactics lack any
substantial link to a lawful purpose, and the proposed approach
can often remedy the damage they cause by allowing detailed
disclosure.
Finally, some fact scenarios, such as the investigations of
the NAACP or of Martin Luther King, have involved a complete
lack of a violation-oriented focus. In such a case, the proposed
approach would focus analysis on the investigation's lack of
any nexus with a lawful purpose, and would allow disclosure of
all investigatory records in their entirety. Even in this extreme
situation, however, potential disclosures that would compound
an already illegal invasion of privacy, such as disclosure of in-
formation concerning an individual's sexual habits or other per-
sonal characteristics, would require special consideration. The
exercise of judicial discretion to refuse disclosure in such a
case would certainly seem appropriate, and would be logical
under the approach advocated here.149
With these illustrations in mind, the test proposed in this
Note can be stated more succinctly: when disclosure sought
under the FOIA includes a colorable claim that the FBI records
were gathered in an unlawful investigation or by illegal means,
the FBI must first establish the nexus between records it seeks
to withhold and the lawful, violation-oriented purpose of its in-
vestigation. The court should then consider that nexus in light
of a demonstrated risk of harm under Exemption 7. Unless
there is a reasonable nexus between the lawful purpose and
the records withheld, or, absent such a nexus, a serious risk of
grave harm to third parties from disclosure, the requested in-
formation should be released.
The judicial discretion inherent in this approach would be
quite narrow in practice. This discretion is justifiable because
FOIA suits are proceedings for injunctive relief, and courts of
equity generally have broad discretion in granting relief.150 Al-
149. The third party adversely affected should assert this privacy interest.
The government may move in the nature of an interpleader, joining any parties
whose privacy interest would be significantly invaded. Cf. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (7) (C) (1976) ("unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"). The par-
ties thus joined may at that time petition the court for equitable relief in the
form of expungement. See Note, Governmental Investigations of the Exercise of
First Amendment Rights: Citizens' Rights and Remedies, 60 Mm'N. L REV. 1257,
1275-81 (1976).
150. The FOIA contains no provision for mandatory judicial enforcement-
"On complaint, the district court ... has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records .... " 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1976) (emphasis
added).
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though most courts have held that they have no general equita-
ble power to refuse enforcement of the Act,151 many of those
same courts have agreed that there may be "exceptional cir-
cumstances in which a court could fairly conclude that Con-
gress intended to leave room for the operation of limited
judicial discretion."15 2 Indeed, the limited judicial discretion
advocated in this Note is far more faithful to the disclosure pre-
sumption Congress intended than the per se rule of Irons and
Kuehnert.
The discretion not to enforce disclosure when the FOIA ap-
pears to require it becomes extremely narrow when the poli-
cies favoring disclosure are weighed into the balance. The
courts have recognized both that there is a genuine and signifi-
cant public interest in knowing how the FBI proceeds in inves-
tigating a member of a "subversive organization",153 and that
disclosure of informants' names may be "directly relevant to an
understanding of the nature and extent of the surveillance." 5 4
Even the Irons court admitted that "[w]here available facts
tend to show the existence of the very overreaching ... in-
tended to [be] expose[d] by... Exemption 7, a court should
use special caution to insure that the limited exemptions from
exposure are not used to defeat [their own] purpose." 5 5 More-
over, because the FOIA "does not authorize withholding of in-
formation.., except as specifically stated" in the FOIA,156 the
judicial discretion advocated in this Note would most often be
exercised in favor of disclosure.
The approach suggested here presents a structure within
which courts can protect against serious Exemption 7 harms
and yet allow the fullest possible disclosure of agency records
and documents. The approach underscores how unnecessary it
151. See, e.g., County of Madison, N.Y. v. Department of Justice, No. 80-1582
(1st Cir. Mar. 3, 1981). Commentators have also argued that courts have no eq-
uitable discretion under the FOIA. See Project, supra note 12, at 1155-62; Com-
ment, The Status of Law Enforcement Manuals Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 75 Nw. L. REv. 734, 763-66 (1980).
152. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see Renegotiation
Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 20 (1974); Reporter's Comm. for
Freedom of the Press v. Sampson, 591 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Halperin v.
Department of State, 565 F.2d 699, 706-07 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also 1 K. DAVIS,
supra note 12, § 5:25 (1978 & Supp. 1980); Note, supra note 12, at 911-20.
153. See Ferguson v. Kelley, 448 F. Supp. 919, 922 (N.D. Ill. 1978), modified,
455 F. Supp. 324, 327 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
154. Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. 778, 792 (D.R.I.), rev'd on
other grounds, 602 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1979).
155. Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d at 476.
156. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976).
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is to shield FBI misconduct under a per se rule and avoids the
risk, inherent in the approach taken in Abramson, that serious
harm from full disclosure might occur. Finally, the approach is
faithful to the disclosure policies underlying Exemption 7, and
conserves judicial resources by only requiring a minimal show-
ing of lawful purposes by the FBI, absent a colorable claim of
unlawfulness.
V. CONCLUSION
The overriding mandate of the Freedom of Information Act
is that each federal agency must, upon request, disclose its
records to any person unless the information contained in the
records is specifically exempted by the Act. Exemption 7, how-
ever, protects "investigatory records compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes" if their disclosure would result in one of six
specified harms.
Application of Exemption 7 to information collected in "un-
lawful" FBI investigations has presented courts with a difficult
but fundamental issue of public access to government-con-
trolled information. In part because Congress has not ex-
pressly indicated whether the products of unlawful FBI
investigations should fall within Exemption 7, the courts have
reached starkly different results. One leading circuit has deter-
mined that all records from investigations that lack a "lawful
purpose" must be fully disclosed, even though such disclosure
may, in some instances, cause severe harm to third parties.
Other circuits have applied Exemption 7 to permit FBI with-
holding of information regardless of whether the material with-
held was collected in an unlawful investigation.
This Note has suggested that neither approach is adequate,
and has proposed that courts should instead consider the
nexus between the withheld documents and the asserted law-
ful investigatory purpose. When that nexus is weak or tenuous,
courts should examine whether disclosure would result in one
of the specific harms protected against by Exemption 7. Unless
there is a serious risk of grave harm of this type, disclosure
should be ordered.
Such an approach is more faithful to the accessibility prin-
ciple underlying the FOIA, yet it still protects against serious
risks of harm. Also, by limiting its applicability to situations in
which a colorable claim of FBI unlawfulness is present, the ap-
proach conserves judicial and FBI resources and limits the
scope of judicial discretion to cases of clear necessity-those in
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which the Act itself is unclear. Finally, the approach promotes
the deterrent function of the FOIA and Exemption 7-providing
the access to information that is critical if Congress and the
public are to effectively monitor and prevent unlawful or abu-
sive FBI activity.
